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10 Abstract 
11 
12 Purpose 
13 This study explores the role of the manufacturer–supplier relationship in service performance 
14 
15 within service triads. 
16 
17 Design/methodology/approach 
18 An abductive case-research approach was adopted, using three embedded cases and twenty-six 
19 interviews  in  complex, multilevel  manufacturer–supplier relationships  within the same service 
20 network. Cannon and Perreault’s (1999) multidimensional relationship framework was deployed 
22 to achieve granular and nuanced insight. 
23 
24 Findings 
25 This   study  corroborates   the   idea   that   relational   relationships   within   service   triads and 
26 servitization   improve   performance.   The   role   of   each   relationship   dimension   in service 
27 
28 performance  is  discerned,  and  their  interplay  is  captured  in  an  analytic  model. Information 
29 exchange,  supplier  relationship-specific  adaptations,  and  the  degree  of  formalization  of  the 
30 relationship directly influence performance, while cooperative norms and operational linkages 
31 are further back in the causal ordering. The study also highlights the importance of contingent 
32 factors and how they affect the relationship dimensions. 
33 
34 
35 Research limitations/implications 
36 The work was conducted in one network and the findings were generalized to theory rather  than 
37 additonal empirical settings. 
38 
39 
Originality/value 
41 This study is the first to derive a contextualized causal ordering of the Cannon and Perreault 
42 (1999) framework of relationship connectors and link it with service performance. 
43 
44 Keywords: Service triads, Service performance, Relationship Influences, Abductive Case Study. 
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1. Introduction 
4 
5 In Business-to-Business (B2B) settings, a manufacturer adopting a service-based business model 
6 
7 (e.g., servitization – Baines et al., 2009) often assigns service delivery to suppliers (e.g., Cohen 
8 
9 et al., 2006; Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden, 2011). Thus, the manufacturer, its customer, and 
10 the service supplier become interlinked. Each actor has direct contact with the other two, forming 
12 a service triad (Wynstra et al., 2015). In such structural arrangements, an actor can influence 
13 
14 (and be influenced by) the relationship between the other two actors (e.g., Choi and Wu,   2009). 
15 
16 An implication of this interdependence is that the supplier, with its service performance  towards 
17 
18 the customers, can affect  customer satisfaction, and  consequently, the    manufacturer–customer 
19 relationship  and  customer  loyalty  (Li  and  Choi,  2009).  Hence,  ensuring  that  the    supplier 
20 
21 performs to desired standards becomes an issue of importance to the manufacturer (Pawar et  al., 
22 
23 2009). 
24 
25 Prior research into service triads has examined pure service settings such as restaurants or 
26 IT outsourcing (e.g., Autry et al. 2014; Li and Choi, 2009). It has also researched relationships in 
27 
28 servitized contexts, but without considering the implications for service performance (e.g.,  Bastl 
29 
30 et  al.,  2012).  The  intent  of  this  study  is  twofold.  Firstly,  to  determine  the  role  of  the 
31 
32 manufacturer–supplier relationship in the supplier’s service performance towards the 
33 manufacturer’s customers. In doing so, this work studies a dyad within a triad (Wu and Choi, 
35 2005,  Wynstra  et  al.,  2015),  where  the  third  actor  (i.e.,  the  customer)  is  affected  by    the 
36 
37 relationship  dynamics  between  the  manufacturer  and  the  supplier.  Secondly,  to  generate  a 
38 
39 nuanced and granular account of the roles of the individual dimensions of manufacturer–supplier 
40 
41 relationship. This extends prior research in service triads that has tended to adopt a binary 
42 classification (e.g., transactional or relational) of relationships (e.g., Wuyts et al., 2015). To do 
43 
44 this, the Cannon and Perrault (1999) framework of relationship connectors is adopted. 
45 
46 This  study  makes  the  following  contributions.  First,  it  substantiates  that     relational 
47 
48 relationships within service triads improve service performance of the supplier to the customer 
49 (cf.  Peng  et  al.,  2010).  Second,  it  unveils  contingent factors  that  influence  the relationships 
51 within the service triads    being studied adding greater theoretical nuance to the extant literature. 
52 
53 Third, it answers the call by Cannon and Perreault (1999) to qualitatively understand how the 
54 
55 relationship  connectors  are  ordered,  by  discerning  the  individual  role  of  each   relationship 
56 
57 connector and their contextual determinants. This is important as it indicates that the   contingent 
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factors and some connectors are antecedents of other connectors, and they    combinatorially lead 
4 
5 to improved service performance. 
6 
7 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the literature review covers service 
8 
9 performance,  servitization  and  service  triads,  and  introduces  Cannon  and  Perreault’s (1999) 
10 framework of relationship connectors. The methodology section presents a detailed account of 
12 the design and execution of this study. This is followed by the presentation of the within and 
13 
14 cross-case  analyses,  the  model  that  emerges  from  the  cross-case  analysis,  and  finally,   the 
15 
16 discussion and conclusions. 
17 
18 
19 2. Literature review 
20 
21 
22 2.1 Service performance and the influence of inter-firm relationships 
23 
24 The  nature  of  a  Buyer–Supplier  relationship  affects the  supplier’s  service  performance. For 
25 example, practices that foster supplier partnering and closer customer relationships enhance a 
27 firms’ service performance (Droge et al., 2012). Where there is service co-production between 
28 
29 personnel  from  the  two  parties,  close  interpersonal  relationships  foster  the  development  of 
30 
31 cooperative norms, and safeguard against hazards that are poorly predicted in explicit contracts 
32 
33 (Guo  and  Ng,  2011),  resulting  in  service  performance  improvements.  Similarly,  a  positive 
34 association  between   relationship  characteristics   (e.g.,   trust,   commitment,  asset  specificity, 
35 
36 information  sharing)  and  a  firm’s  operational  or  relationship  performance  has  been   found 
37 
38 (Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Yigitbasioglu, 2010; Wacker et al., 2016;). Such constructs often 
39 
40 encompass aspects of service performance such as customer service support and service   quality 
41 improvements (e.g., Cai et al., 2011). Moreover, there is evidence of bidirectional causality –   or 
43 the  relationship–performance  spiral  (Autry  and  Golicic,  2010).  Over  time,  the    association 
44 
45 between  relationship  strength/quality  and  performance  is  cyclical,  whereby  the  relationship 
46 
47 strength/quality is both a precondition and an outcome of performance. Similarly, the association 
48 
49 between  relationship  dimensions  such  as  trust,  transparency,  communication  intensity    and 
50 openness  has  been  argued  to  be  cyclical,  impacting business  performance  through feedback 
51 
52 loops (see: Akkermans et al., 2004). Thus, a firm’s service performance is often a function of the 
53 
54 characteristics of its inter-firm relationships. There is a need however to discuss this  relationship 
55 
56 further in the context of servitization and service triads. 
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2.2 Servitization and service triads 
4 
5 
6 The effective provision of servitized offerings is a collective effort by manufacturers and their 
7 
8 external partners (Lockett et al., 2011; Benedetti et al. 2015). When service delivery is   assigned 
9 to  independent  suppliers,  a  “service  triad”  is  formed  (Wynstra  et  al.,  2015).  For  example, 
11 Caterpillar uses independent dealers to provide customer service support (Fites, 1996), and Cisco 
12 
13 relies on suppliers to service its equipment at its customers’ sites (Cohen et al., 2006). Services 
14 
15 are inseperable (Sampson and Froehle, 2006), therefore the service supplier has to interact    with 
16 
17 the customer when delivering the services (Li and Choi, 2009; Finne and Holmström, 2013). 
18 Hence,  service  triads  in  B2B  contexts  are  transitive  by  nature,  i.e.  the  triadic  actors 
19 
20 (manufacturer, customer and service supplier) form and maintain direct ties between  themselves 
21 
22 (Wynstra et al., 2015). 
23 
24 Due to  the interdependence between  actor performance  and  the nature  of  the    dyadic 
25 relationships within service triads (Hartmann and Herb, 2015), an actor (e.g., the    manufacturer) 
27 can be influenced by an indirect relationship (between the service supplier and a customer) and 
28 
29 vice versa, while a relationship (e.g., manufacturer–customer) can influence another  relationship 
30 
31 (manufacturer–supplier). Thus, in the context of servitization, the effective provision of the 
32 
33 offering, customer satisfaction and loyalty to the manufacturer, depend on the performance of the 
34 supplier responsible for the delivery of the services (e.g., Li and Choi, 2009; van der Valk and 
35 
36 van Iwaarden, 2011). Therefore, the performance of the actors in service triads will depend on 
37 
38 the nature of relationships between them. For instance, coordination mechanisms such as  formal 
39 
40 contracts, coupled with trust, elicit higher cooperative performance when compared solely to 
41 market  (i.e.,  price)  mechanisms  (Peng  et  al.,  2010).  A  relational  relationship  between   the 
43 manufacturer  and  the  service  supplier  also  enhances  the  customer  focus  of  the     supplier, 
44 
45 improving its customer service performance (Wuyts et al., 2015). For the provision of   solutions 
46 
47 trust, relationship adaptations, aligned incentives, operational integration, risk-sharing 
48 
49 agreements, and intense and diverse information sharing between the partners are increasingly 
50 important (Lockett et al. 2011; Bastl et al., 2012). 
51 
52 The extant research on service triads has taken place in pure service contexts as   opposed 
53 
54 to contexts where there  is product–service integration (Li  and Choi, 2009;  Autry et  al.   2014). 
55 
56 Furthermore, other studies on servitization do not examine the implications of relationships on 
57 service performance explicitly (Peng et al., 2010; Bastl et al., 2012). Finally, researchers tend  to 
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selectively focus on particular aspects of the relationship, such as cooperation or governance 
4 
5 mechanisms, or adopt a “blunt” distinction between relational and transactional relationships (cf. 
6 
7 Mena et al., 2013). The next section introduces Cannon and Perreault’s (1999) framework of 
8 
9 relationship connectors, which this study adopts to provide a more holistic and multidimensional 
10 view of manufacturer–supplier relationships. 
12 
13 
14 2.3 Cannon and Perreault’s framework of relationship connectors 
15 
16 The adoption of Cannon and Perrault’s (1999) framework follows an established tradition in  the 
17 
18 Operations  and  Supply  Chain  Management  field  of  treating  inter-firm  relationships  as      a 
19 multidimensional construct (e.g., Ellram and Hendrick 1995; Autry et al., 2014). Rooted in a 
20 
21 number of broader theories (social exchange theory, transaction cost economics and resource 
22 
23 dependence theory), the framework suggests that an inter-firm relationship is formed of five 
24 
25 relationship connectors, defined as, “dimensions    that reflect the behaviours and expectations of 
26 behaviours in a buyer-seller relationship” and “reflect the manner in which two parties interrelate 
27 
28 and conduct commercial exchange” (Cannon and Perreault 1999, p.441). The connectors, their 
29 
30 original definitions, and a summary of their role, are included in Table 1. 
31 
32 
33 
-----------------------------------------Insert Table 1 approximately here----------------------------------- 
35 
36 
37 There   are   several   reasons   for   adopting   this   framework.   First,   a buyer–supplier 
38 
39 relationship is a complex system of multiple, rich, interpersonal interfaces (Ellram and Hendrick, 
40 
41 1995). Thus, the dimensions of the relationship emerge over time as a result of the experience 
42 and outcomes of ongoing interaction (Ritter et al., 2004). The complexity and repetitiveness of 
43 
44 interactions  are  more  strongly  manifested  in  servitization,  where  long-term, interdependent, 
45 
46 multifaceted relationships are the norm, and high levels of information and knowledge  exchange 
47 
48 are required (e.g., Johnson and Mena, 2008; Bastl et al., 2012). As the connectors capture unique 
49 information,  the  individual  role  of  each  in  the  performance  of  the  service  supplier  is 
51 disentangled. 
52 
53 Second, in contrast to high-order elusive concepts such as commitment and trust, the 
54 
55 relationship connectors 
56 
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4 
5 
6 
7 Third, studies have selectively adopted Cannon  and Perreault’s (1999)  connectors,    but 
8 
9 few have employed the framework in its entirety (cf. Penttinen and Palmer, 2007; Saccani et   al., 
10 2014;).  Additionally,  the  framework  has  been  used  to  study  servitization  and  service triads 
12 specifically, due to its holistic nature (cf. Penttinen and Palmer, 2007; Bastl et al., 2012; Autry et 
13 
14 al., 2014). None of these works, however, has focussed on the interplay between connectors  and 
15 
16 their implications for service performance, despite the call by Cannon and Perreault (1999)    and 
17 
18 Bastl et al. (2012) for further research. 
19 This  work  satisfies  the  following  objectives:   First,   to  understand  the  role  of     the 
20 
21 manufacturer–supplier  relationship  in  the  service  performance  of  the  supplier  towards    the 
22 
23 manufacturer’s customers. As such, this work studies a dyad within a service triad and its service 
24 
25 performance implications. Second, to determine the role of, and interplay between, Cannon   and 
26 Perrault’s (1999) relationship connectors in a manufacturer–supplier relationship, and how   they 
27 
28 affect  the  supplier’s  service  performance.  This  allows  for  a  more  nuanced understanding of 
29 
30 relationships within triads. 
31 
32 
33 
3. Methodology 
35 
36 To address the objectives of this study, an abductive case research approach was adopted. Case 
37 
38 studies  are  appropriate  when  the  environment  under  study  is  complex,  such  as  when    the 
39 
40 boundaries between the phenomenon of interest and the context are unclear (Hartley, 2004).   By 
41 documenting practices and behaviours, and the meanings that participants ascribe to them  (Voss 
43 et al., 2002), case studies can also help the researcher to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
44 
45 nature and inherent complexity of the phenomenon. The rationale for adopting an abductive 
46 
47 approach is that it allows the researcher to cycle between theory and empirical data through 
48 
49 “systematic combining” (cf. Dubois and Gadde, 2002). In that way, the research was neither 
50 constrained by theory, nor overwhelmed by data without an initial lens through which to view 
51 
52 the data. Abduction allows one to anchor his or her findings to an initial theory that is then 
53 
54 developed  —and  possibly  extended—  through  each  round  of  data  collection  and    analysis 
55 
56 (Kovacs and Spens, 2005). Theory development  and data  collection and analysis are    therefore 
57 symbiotically linked. 
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As part of this work, an embedded, comparative case study research design was   adopted 
4 
5 (Yin, 2009). A “case” in this research refers to an inter-firm working relationship between the 
6 
7 manufacturer —operating in the UK commercial vehicles industry— and one of its specialist 
8 
9 service suppliers (partner). These partners are responsible for the delivery of services to the 
10 manufacturer’s customers, forming multiple triads. The analysis and findings are based on  three 
12 such embedded cases. Before explicating the case selection procedure, the research setting is 
13 
14 briefly described. 
15 
16 
17 
18 3.1 Empirical Setting 
19 Fortigo   (a   pseudonym)   is   the   UK   subsidiary   of   a   large   German   commercial  vehicle 
20 
21 manufacturer. Fortigo provides “solutions” to customers and is considered by industry experts to 
22 
23 be class-leading. Fortigo aspires to “sell per kilometre” instead of selling a commercial   vehicle. 
24 
25 Instead of buying a vehicle, the customer pays a weekly fee week based on the services  included 
26 in the contract. For contracted vehicles, services can be “regular” (e.g., preventive inspection and 
27 
28 maintenance, British Ministry of Transport (MOT) test of roadworthiness) or “emergency”  (e.g., 
29 
30 breakdown attendance), and are provided by a network of service sites. Thirty percent of them 
31 
32 are wholly owned, with the rest being independent suppliers operating as franchisees. Employees 
33 at the service sites need to be technically adept to repair vehicles and competent in using the 
35 multiple  online  Fortigo  systems  and  platforms  for  locating,   recording,  and       transmitting 
36 
37 information regarding the contracted vehicles. At the time of this study, approximately 60% of 
38 
39 Fortigo’s  yearly revenues  came  from  customized  fixed-cost  service  contracts,  typically with 
40 
41 large business  customers.  The remaining 40%  came from  the sale of stand-alone     vehicles  to 
42 smaller businesses and owner-drivers, and their ad hoc after-sale support. 
43 
44 In 2005, after discussions with major customers, Fortigo introduced new clauses in the 
45 
46 franchise  agreement  (e.g.,  cleanliness,  image)  to  influence  customer  satisfaction.      Service 
47 
48 performance aspects were translated into Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) tied to a    quarterly 
49 financial   bonus   scheme.   KPIs   include,   among   others:  breakdown   response   times, parts 
51 availability,  and  vehicle  first  time  pass  rate  for  the  MOT  roadworthiness  test.  These KPIs 
52 
53 indicate how good each service site is at maximizing vehicle availability (e.g., vehicle “uptime”), 
54 
55 while bonus money is proportional to the number of achieved KPIs and the number of hours 
56 
57 spent servicing vehicles under contract or warranty. Consequently, the manufacturer has been 
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consistently measuring the service performance of its network members towards its customers, 
4 
5 and  rewarding  service  sites  accordingly.  Moreover,  Fortigo’s  customers  considered  vehicle 
6 
7 uptime  a  proxy  for  their  satisfaction.  During  the  explorative  phase  of  the  study  this   was 
8 
9 corroborated by top managers of Fortigo and by two major hauliers. 
10 Interaction and communication between Fortigo and the independent sites is done via    e- 
12 mail, telephone, and face-to-face meetings, and spans several levels and departments. Fortigo 
13 
14 maintains contact with its customers at the strategic and operational levels. The sites are    also in 
15 
16 direct  interaction  with  the  customers  of  Fortigo  for  planned  (e.g.,  before  and  during     the 
17 
18 mandatory six-week vehicle inspection) or unplanned (e.g., part replacement) service delivery. 
19 Hauliers  and  logistics  providers  have  large  fleets,  meaning  that  direct      supplier–customer 
20 
21 interaction is frequent. Therefore, the actors in this study exhibit distinctive structural features of 
22 
23 service triads, where service suppliers have to be in direct contact with the customer (Wynstra  et 
24 
25 al., 2015). In sum, the research setting comprises service triads and provides an appropriate 
26 environment   for   objectively   sampling   service   sites,  and   comparing   and   contrasting the 
27 
28 relationships based on the service performance scores of those individual sites. 
29 
30 
31 
32 3.2 Case selection 
33 We sampled three service sites based on their performance between 2009 and 2011, across the 
35 five major KPIs set and measured by Fortigo. A stratified, purposeful sampling strategy  (Patton, 
36 
37 2002) was adopted, selecting one site from each performance stratum (high, average, low)  based 
38 
39 on an average score across KPIs and over time. Thus in the analysis, the role of each relationship 
40 
41 connector in the service performance of the site derived its significance from having emerged out 
42 of heterogeneity. It also allowed the examination of the similarities and major variations between 
43 
44 cases (Patton 2002). The sites and their performance scores are detailed in Table 2. 
45 
46 
47 -----------------------------------------Insert Table 2 approximately here----------------------------------- 
48 
49 
50 3.3 Data Collection 
51 
52 Data were collected from 24 respondents from the focal firm (Fortigo) and the three service  sites 
53 
54 (Chi,  Psi,  Zeta).  A  protocol  was  developed  to  guide  the  research,  which,  in  line  with  the 
55 
56 abductive tradition, evolved over the course of data collection. The first protocol was focused 
57 upon  the  evolution  of  the  network,  the  interaction  between  Fortigo  and  the  sites,  and  the 
58 
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incentives scheme. As more data were collected, the relationship connectors were 
4 
5 operationalized  to  the  case  context.  Interviews  were  conducted  with  individuals  who  were 
6 
7 identified as being the most knowledgeable about the relationship. Secondary data were collected 
8 
9 during the research (e.g., documentation, organograms) to aid triangulation (Jick, 1979). Table  3 
10 lists the interviewees. 
12 
13 -----------------------------------------Insert Table 3 approximately here----------------------------------- 
14 
15 
16 
17 3.4 Data Analysis 
18 Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and input into qualitative data analysis  software 
19 
20 (NVivo 9.0). Due to data collection taking place sequentially, and in line with abduction, each 
21 
22 case was coded separately using template analysis (King 2004). The five relationship  connectors 
23 
24 comprised the a priori level-one categories in the hierarchy, and the context-specific facets    and 
25 manifestations operationalizing the connectors constituted the provisional sub-categories.  These 
27 are listed in Table 4. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 -----------------------------------------Insert Table 4 approximately here----------------------------------- 
33 
34 
35 All data were scrutinized at least three times before the case-specific templates were   considered 
36 
37 “final” (King 2004). After each interview was analysed, the protocol was revisited and altered  if 
38 
39 the findings suggested a revision. Extensive case reports were duly produced, structured   around 
40 
41 the five relationship connectors. All three authors independently reviewed the reports, and agreed 
42 that contingent variables, exogenous to the relationship that were present in transcripts from   the 
43 
44 early  rounds  of  interviewing,  had  a  role  to  play  in  service  performance.  The  protocol was 
45 
46 subsequently adjusted  and the contingent factors were  made part of the analytic    ‘story’.  Their 
47 
48 inclusion was necessary in order to describe and understand the effect of relationship  connectors 
49 on performance in this study. The two factors were: 
50 
51 1. Service site size (measured by the number of individuals employed). Firm size often 
52 
53 reflects  unobserved  features  such  as  “scale  and  scope  economies,  market   power 
54 
55 aspirations, and the ability to aggregate inputs” (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984, p. 
56 
57 388). In this context, there was a stark contrast between the operation of the smaller 
58 
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Zeta and the larger Chi and Psi, which were part of large, national chains with well- 
4 
5 defined organization structures, reporting to a board of directors and private investors. 
6 
7 2. Proportion of the site’s revenues coming from Fortigo fixed-cost contracts and 
8 
9 warranty activity (from now on “product–service penetration” or PS penetration). This 
10 is closely related to the concept of service penetration which positively influences   the 
12 effective and efficient delivery of product–service offerings (Fischer et al., 2010).   PS 
13 
14 penetration  is  largely  outside  of  the  service  site’s  control,  and  depends  on      the 
15 
16 customer-base in the site’s geographical area (e.g. large fleet customers are more likely 
17 
18 to  have  their  vehicles  under  Fortigo  service  contracts)  and  how  effective  has the 
19 Fortigo salesforce been in the area. As such, it can vary considerably between   service 
20 
21 sites: for some, it comprises a major part of their work (see Table 2). The remaining 
22 
23 work comes from ad hoc servicing and from non-Fortigo vehicles. Thus, in this  study, 
24 
25 PS penetration is a measure of how dependent a site is on Fortigo’s product–service 
26 offerings  for  revenues.  This is in line with a  long research  tradition that     measures 
27 
28 dependence as the percentage of a company’s business that comes from contracts with 
29 
30 another company, and the size of the contribution that this makes to the former’s 
31 
32 profits (e.g. El-Ansary and Stern, 1972). Simultaneously, PS penetration indicates how 
33 accustomed  the  employees  of  a  site  are  to  dealing  with  vehicles  under     service 
35 contracts.  These  contracts,  which  are  between  the  customer  and  Fortigo,  include 
36 
37 service features that require the use of the Fortigo inter-organizational IT platforms. 
38 
39 
40 
41 As part of the cross-case analysis, the lead author conducted a second cycle of coding, 
42 which involved the original data corpus, the case reports, and personal notes that recorded the 
43 
44 impressions and ideas of the other two authors. This discerned the role of each relationship 
45 
46 connector  and  contingent  factor  in  the performance of  the site,  and  uncovered  the  interplay 
47 
48 between them. To this end, pattern coding (Miles and Huberman 1994) was applied, whereby 
49 each code reflected a causal relation between elements. These relations were phrased in the form 
51 of propositions and were compiled into an analytical model that addresses the study’s  objective. 
52 
53 The model provides a nuanced account of the influence of the manufacturer–supplier relationship 
54 
55 on the service performance of the supplier, by capturing the individual role of each   relationship 
56 
57 connector, exogenous variables, and the interplay between them. 
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4 
5 4. Findings 
6 
7 
8 4.1 Within- and cross-case analysis 
9 The results of the within-case analysis are presented in a connector-by-connector manner in 
11 Table 5. 
12 
13 
14 -----------------------------------------Insert Table 5 approximately here----------------------------------- 
15 
16 
17 
Table 6 presents the cross-case comparison (second column), and the relative  magnitude 
19 of each connector (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This categorisation is routinely undertaken in 
20 
21 similar comparative case study research (e.g., Pagell and Wu, 2009). Thus, the three cases are 
22 
23 ranked based on their manifest levels of the five relationship connectors. The results indicate that 
24 
25 although the connectors are not perfectly correlated, if one ranked the three relationships on a 
26 transactional–relational relationship continuum (cf. Mena et al., 2013), the Chi case is the most 
27 
28 relational, then Psi, with Zeta being the least relational. In addition, Table 6 includes information 
29 
30 on the sites’ average service performance. Chi has been performing exceptionally with  Fortigo’s 
31 
32 customers,  Psi  is  average,  and  Zeta  is  below  average.  Therefore,  the  more  relational    the 
33 relationship between the manufacturer and the service site, the higher the service performance of 
35 the site towards the manufacturer’s customers. Beyond establishing the interdependence between 
36 
37 the nature of the manufacturer-supplier relationship and service performance, the purpose of this 
38 
39 study is to submit a nuanced account of how this relationship affects service performance. This is 
40 
41 discussed next. 
42 
43 
44 -----------------------------------------Insert Table 6 approximately here----------------------------------- 
45 
46 
47 
48 4.2  The  Influence  of  the  Manufacturer–Supplier  Relationship  on  the  Supplier’s        Service 
49 Performance 
50 
51 Figure  1  shows  the  interplay  between  the  relationship  dimensions,  contingent  factors,   and 
52 
53 supplier service performance. Each link in the model is numbered and was considered salient 
54 
55 only if  at  least  two  of  the  three  cases  provided  supporting  evidence  without  the  third case 
56 
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disconfirming it. This section describes the role of each element with reference to the linkages  it 
4 
5 has. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 approximately here ------------------------------------ 
11 
12 
13 The role of product–service penetration. Chi’s high level of PS penetration means that 
14 
15 they have accumulated significant experience in servicing vehicles under contract. This  requires 
16 
17 familiarity with and competence in using the web-based systems for recording the activities   and 
18 electronic transmission of information. Network-facing Fortigo managers suggested that   within 
19 
20 the network of service sites, Chi are amongst the most compliant to the implicitly imposed   roles 
21 
22 and  routines  for  the  efficient  utilization  of  the  systems  (i.e.,  the  first  facet  of   operational 
23 
24 linkages). With joint activities (i.e., the second facet of the construct), as the large customer 
25 fleets in the area are on fixed-cost contracts, staff from Chi are often involved in review meetings 
27 with Fortigo sales and after-sales key account managers, and customer representatives. Similarly, 
28 
29 joint local customer visits with the co-located Fortigo salesmen are frequent. Thus, in the Chi– 
30 
31 Fortigo case, high PS  penetration implies high levels of operational  linkages. Contrarily,    Zeta 
32 
33 and Psi are located in rural areas with predominantly small business customers or owner-drivers, 
34 meaning fewer  vehicles  on service contracts  and  less  frequent interaction with national   fleets 
35 
36 compared to Chi (i.e. low PS penetration). For this reason they have fewer joint activities with 
37 
38 Fortigo.  In  addition,  and  especially with  Zeta,  employees  often  encounter  issues  realated to 
39 
40 vehicles  under  contract  with  which  they have little experience,  and  consequently have to use 
41 unfamiliar functions of the web-based systems. This limited exposure to solutions decreases their 
43 adherence to the roles and routines required for the use of the web-based systems. Overall, the 
44 
45 Chi and Zeta cases suggest that PS penetration and operational linkages are positively associated 
46 
47 (high-high vs. low-low). The Psi case differs slightly (low PS penetration and   moderate-to-high 
48 
49 operational linkages – see Table 6) but the analysis suggests that this is due to the influence of 
50 size (P3 below). Accordingly, it is proposed that: 
51 
52 
53 
54 P1: The higher the service site’s PS penetration, the higher the operational integration   between 
55 
56 the site and the manufacturer. 
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Although contracts are homogenous, and the prescribed rules and obligations apply equally to all 
4 
5 service sites, the manner in which employees perceive these rules and obligations varies from 
6 
7 site to site. Chi’s extensive experience with Fortigo’s fixed-cost contract customers has led to a 
8 
9 clear understanding of the explicit rules and procedures, and of the jobs that can be claimed for 
10 and reimbursed. This was confirmed by the site’s consistently excellent performance in audits 
12 conducted by Fortigo. Since more than 50% of its overall revenue comes from service   contracts 
13 
14 and warranty activity, Chi employees have no choice but to adhere closely to the prescribed rules 
15 
16 and routines. This obligation is taken for granted, and is deeply embedded    in the site’s working 
17 
18 culture. Thus, Chi do not perceive their site’s relationship with Fortigo to be   overly formalized. 
19 Conversely, due to the low product–service penetration (around 20% in both instances), Psi   and 
20 
21 Zeta are less familiar with the rules and procedures, and are consequently less clear about   them. 
22 
23 This was also demonstrated through recent fines imposed on both sites for non-compliance 
24 
25 which left employees disgruntled. The interviewees questioned whether a small PS penetration 
26 should   be   associated   with   so   much   rigidity   and   intolerance   to   deviations   (i.e., over- 
27 
28 formalization). This is because low PS penetration means that few labour hours are “sold” to 
29 
30 Fortigo for servicing vehicles under contract. Since the monetary bonus tied to the incentives 
31 
32 scheme is proportional to the number of hours sold, the maximum amount of money that sites 
33 with low PS penetration can earn through the scheme is small. Thus, a small potential   monetary 
35 reward does not justify strict adherence to the contractually prescribed rules. It is too much effort 
36 
37 for too little benefit, prompting Zeta and Psi to ask for “more discretion” and “less red tape.” 
38 
39 Further, Fortigo’s intolerance to deviations exacerbates the perception of over-formalization.  On 
40 
41 the basis of the above, it is proposed that: 
42 
43 P2:  The  lower  the  service  site’s  PS  penetration,  the  higher  the  level  of  perceived     over- 
44 
45 formalization of its relationship with the manufacturer. 
46 
47 
48 
49 The role of site size. Chi and Psi have enough back-office personnel to create an efficient 
50 work organization that includes task specialization. Consequently, they have developed expertise 
51 
52 in  handling the  web-based  systems;  routines  are  followed  closely and  contract  and warranty 
53 
54 related  jobs  are  completed  efficiently.  Conversely,  being  a  small,  family-run  business, Zeta 
55 
56 cannot afford task specialization due to resource constraints. The three people in the  back-office 
57 are responsible for a wide range of tasks, including helping on the shop floor. None of them is   a 
56 
57 
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dedicated administrator, and the contracts and warranty manager is required on the shop floor on 
4 
5 busy  days,  or  when  a  mechanic  is  on  leave.  Thus,  employees  are  not  able  to  develop the 
6 
7 necessary competence to adhere to the implicit roles and routines that come with the  interlinking 
8 
9 systems. Additionally, their small size appears to be one of the reasons behind the   nonexistence 
10 of joint activities between Zeta and Fortigo. Unlike the larger Chi and Psi, Zeta’s scale of 
12 operation does not justify a visit from the parts representative for joint customer visits and  spare 
13 
14 parts  promotion  campaigns,  while  the   new-vehicle  sales   representative  spends  his       time 
15 
16 elsewhere. In effect, the smaller the site, the less likely there will be high operational integration. 
17 
18 Thus, it is proposed that: 
19 
20 
21 P3: The larger the service site, the higher the operational integration of its relationship with   the 
22 
23 manufacturer. 
24 
25 
26 
In this context, site size also affects cooperativeness. Zeta feel that they are    discriminated 
27 
28 against because they are small. They claim that they “know for a fact” that other sites get paid 
29 
30 for jobs for which Zeta are not paid, and are remunerated for which Zeta are required to   provide 
31 
32 further evidence. Furthermore, because of its size, Zeta does not qualify for direct Fortigo parts 
33 delivery. They buy parts from another network member that makes profit on the sales, which is 
35 perceived  as  unfair.  Zeta  believe  that  Fortigo  does  not  care  about  them  and  that  the 
36 
37 uncooperative attitudes by the Fortigo sales representative and parts department are due to Zeta’s 
38 
39 small size. Additionally, Zeta often feel “messed about” because the nearest site, the larger and 
40 
41 more professional  Chi, “steals” their  work,  and  Fortigo allows this to happen. On  the  Fortigo 
42 side,  both  the  CEO  and  after-sales  director  stated  that  they  would  prefer  to  have     10-12 
43 
44 professional service partners with multiple sites. It may be that Fortigo does not consider small 
45 
46 family-owned sites like Zeta part of their future plans, and consequently do not show cooperation 
47 
48 at all levels of the relationship. As a result, the Zeta principal is trying to use the Fortigo 
49 franchise  credential  for  his  business’s  benefit  and sell  the  image  of  an  independent garage, 
51 without a long-term future tied to Fortigo’s. In conclusion, it is proposed that: 
52 
53 
54 
55 P4: The larger the service site, the more cooperative its relationship with the manufacturer. 
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The  role  of   information  exchange.  Frequent   interpersonal   communication  and   the 
4 
5 effective  and  efficient  exchange  and  use  of  information  facilitates  Chi  in  performing tasks 
6 
7 quickly  and  correctly.  Vehicles  are  turned  round  faster,   having  been  serviced       properly. 
8 
9 Occasionally there are long response times (e.g., from the parts department) and the absence of 
10 an out-of-hours communication link hinders job completion and increases vehicle turnaround 
12 times.  Similarly,  Psi  and  Zeta  stressed  that  low  information  availability  leads  to       longer 
13 
14 turnaround times, as the vehicles remain stranded while waiting for Fortigo to respond to a 
15 
16 query. Furthermore, poor communication between the Fortigo used-vehicles sales force and Zeta 
17 
18 and  Psi   often   results  in  vehicles   arriving  for   their   six-week  inspection  or    maintenance 
19 unexpectedly. This never happened to Chi, due to regular information sharing. Moreover, the 
20 
21 inefficiency of Zeta in using the web-based systems means that it often takes them longer to 
22 
23 complete the diagnosis of non-standard defects, and they need to contact Fortigo for    assistance. 
24 
25 Requesting assistance is an unnecessary communication link and Fortigo’s response may not   be 
26 timely leading to delays that affect service performance. Thus, it is proposed that: 
27 
28 
29 
30 P5: The higher the information exchange between manufacturer and service site, the higher the 
31 
32 site’s service performance. 
33 
34 
35 The role of operational linkages. For information to flow between the site and Fortigo, 
36 
37 adherence  to the  roles and routines implicitly defined by the  web-based  systems is   necessary. 
38 
39 The site employees have to record and transmit information (e.g., when diagnosing a vehicle)  to 
40 
41 Fortigo. This information has to be standardized, accurate and complete, which may not occur  if 
42 the assigned person is unfamiliar with the systems. Zeta is unfamiliar with the routines and 
43 
44 procedures, leading to frequent delays. Psi and Chi are more competent than Zeta with the   web- 
45 
46 based systems. Also, Fortigo stated that seven out of ten phone calls from the sites (delaying 
47 
48 vehicle  turnaround)  are  about  information  readily  available  on  the  websites,  meaning   that 
49 routines for efficient information gathering have not been followed. Sites may also have no 
51 computer station on the shop floor for night shift employees to use. Access and transmission of 
52 
53 information is thus delayed, meaning that jobs have to wait. In short, inefficient usage of the 
54 
55 interlinking systems impairs information exchange. 
56 
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With  joint,  routinized  activities  (the  second  facet  of  operational  linkages),  Psi,     and 
4 
5 especially  Chi,  have  regular  meetings  and  customer  visits  with  Fortigo,  where        relevant 
6 
7 information is regularly shared. The absence of such activities with Zeta negates information 
8 
9 exchange. Accordingly, it can be proposed that: 
10 
11 
12 P6: The higher the operational integration between manufacturer and service site, the higher the 
13 
14 levels of information exchange. 
15 
16 
17 
18 The role of cooperative norms. For Chi, the expectation of a long-term future increases 
19 the tendency of individuals from both parties to create interpersonal relationships.   Furthermore, 
20 
21 cooperation and the perception of common goals facilitate communication links, encouraging 
22 
23 open information sharing (e.g., between the site and  the salesmen).  Interpersonal    relationships 
24 
25 were also observed in the other two case relationships (e.g., Psi principal and Fortigo regional 
26 engineer). However, information exchange was lower, because the two sites have issues with 
27 
28 certain departments in Fortigo such as spare parts and contracts (Psi) or the overall   organization 
29 
30 (Zeta).   Due   to   the   perceived   decrease   in   cooperativeness   between   Psi   and     Fortigo, 
31 
32 communication  diminished  (leading  to  a  drop  in  service  performance).  Fortigo’s     regional 
33 engineer stated that staff from Fortigo and Psi “do not bother” to communicate. Thus, it can be 
35 proposed that: 
36 
37 
38 
39 P7:  The more cooperative the manufacturer–service site  relationship,  the higher  the levels    of 
40 
41 information exchange. 
42 
43 
44 The perception of interdependence between Chi and Fortigo facilitates issue resolution in 
45 
46 an informal manner. This happens due to interpersonal relationships such as the one between  the 
47 
48 Chi general manager and the Fortigo repair and maintenance manager. They have known each 
49 other for many years, and trust that every decision taken by both parties is for mutual benefit. 
51 The general manager admitted that this helps in resolving issues informally. Moreover, the 
52 
53 expectation   of   a   prolonged,   cooperative   Fortigo–Chi   relationship,   shared   amongst  Chi 
54 
55 employees,  decreases  the  perceived  level  of  formalization.  Conversely,  the “discriminative” 
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behaviours felt by Psi and Zeta affect their perception of Fortigo’s tolerance to deviations from 
4 
5 the prescribed rules. Thus, informal arrangements are more difficult to develop. Therefore: 
6 
7 
8 
9 P8: The more cooperative the manufacturer–service site relationship, the lower its formalization. 
10 
11 
12 The   role   of   relationship-specific   adaptations.  Relationship-specific   adaptations are 
13 
14 necessary in this context. In all three cases some of the adaptations have lost their specificity, for 
15 
16 example,  investment  in  facilities  and  machinery.  Also,  the  investment  in  Fortigo-organized 
17 
18 technical and administrative training in servicing Fortigo vehicles and using the online platforms 
19 brings  benefits  outside of  the relationship,  as  the site acquires  expertise that  can  be    “sold.” 
20 
21 However, all such investments were performed for Fortigo and, as such, are relationship-specific. 
22 
23 There is a causal link between adaptations and service performance. Zeta believes that   although 
24 
25 training is expensive, it would be difficult to achieve better service levels without investing in  it. 
26 Much of the performance improvement of Psi is attributed to the extensive   relationship-specific 
27 
28 adaptations that took place when the current principal took over. The investment in technology 
29 
30 and training has enabled the employees to service vehicles efficiently and effectively. Chi have 
31 
32 extended their opening hours for Fortigo customers, and can admit vehicles at almost any time 
33 during the week to maximise vehicle uptime. Whilst the levels of adaptations are similar   across 
35 the three cases, performance differs significantly. From this it can be inferred that relationship- 
36 
37 specific  adaptations  are  an  insufficient  condition  for  high  performance,  and     performance 
38 
39 differences are to be explained by differences in the levels of the other constructs.   Nevertheless, 
40 
41 it can be proposed that: 
42 
43 
44 P9: The higher the relationship-specific adaptations by the service site, the higher its service 
45 
46 performance. 
47 
48 
49 
Relationship   specific-adaptations   (e.g.,   recruitment,   IT   infrastructure,   training) also 
51 increase the level of operational linkages. Chi and Psi recruited additional people and assigned 
52 
53 them specific roles and tasks for the efficient utilization of the web-based systems. Investment in 
54 
55 Fortigo-organized training is also beneficial, especially for Psi. Psi’s PS penetration would imply 
56 
57 decreased  operational  integration  (see  P1).  However,  extensive  training  on  the    web-based 
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systems compensates for this disadvantage. Technical training in service and repair processes 
4 
5 also contributes to the efficient usage of the systems (i.e., operational linkages) as the technicians 
6 
7 become more accustomed to capturing and recording information. Thus: 
8 
9 
10 
P10:  The  higher  the  relationship-specific  adaptations  by  the  service  site  the  higher        the 
12 operational integration between the site and the manufacturer. 
13 
14 
15 
16 The role of legal bonds. The third and last direct influence on service performance is legal 
17 
18 bonds.  The performance  of Psi  and  Zeta  are  impeded because their  working relationship with 
19 Fortigo is overly formalized. A number of respondents believe that Fortigo’s “obsession” with 
20 
21 rules and its intolerance to deviations from prescribed processes obstructs them from focusing on 
22 
23 servicing  vehicles,  resulting  in  longer  vehicle  turnaround  times.  Conversely,  there  were no 
24 
25 complaints about the degree of formalization in the Chi case. This is predominantly because 
26 issues can be resolved in an informal manner. Informality is absent in the other two cases. 
27 
28 Informal issue resolution helps bypass the barriers often raised by rigid, prescribed rules, and   is 
29 
30 absent in the Psi and Zeta cases. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
31 
32 
33 
34 P11: Over-formalization of  the manufacturer–service site  relationship reduces supplier   service 
35 performance. 
36 
37 
38 
39 5. Discussion and conclusions 
40 
41 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
43 Through the use of an abductive approach this work extends Cannon and Perreault’s (1999) 
44 
45 theorizing  on  relationship  connectors  to  uncover  the  interplay  between  the  connectors, two 
46 
47 contingent factors (size and product-service penetration), and service performance in service 
48 
49 triads. By adopting an abductive approach, the research extends and contextualises the original 
50 work of Cannon and Perreault (1999). 
51 
52 This   research   makes   three   contributions.   The   first   contribution   shows   that  the 
53 
54 manufacturer–supplier relationship in this service triad plays a significant role in the provision of 
55 
56 the offering as it facilitates or hinders service performance. This corroborates the idea that the 
57 nature of the relationship and the performance of the parties in a triad are interdependent (e.g., 
58 
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Wu and Choi, 2005), and relational  relationships  (i.e.,  high information exchange,   operational 
4 
5 integration,  cooperativeness,  relationship-specific  adaptations,  and  low  formalization)    have 
6 
7 positive consequences for the triad as a whole (Peng et al., 2010; van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 
8 
9 2011; Bastl et  al., 2012;  Wacker  et al.,  2016).  Thus,  when  a manufacturer uses a  supplier  to 
10 deliver services for product-service offerings—whether to access unique external capabilities  or 
12 for cost-based outsourcing—the relationship between the manufacturer and supplier needs to   be 
13 
14 relational rather than transactional. 
15 
16 The second contribution demonstrates that in addition to a relational relationship, for a 
17 
18 supplier to achieve high service performance towards the manufacturer’s customer, significant 
19 exposure to the product–service offering being provided (i.e., service penetration), and access  to 
20 
21 resources and task specialization of staff (afforded through site size) are prerequisites. These 
22 
23 findings indicate that while the relationship connectors are important, contingent factors play a 
24 
25 role in ensuring that the supplier’s performance to the customer is high. For example, without 
26 exposure to and experience with the product–service offerings, suppliers would be unfamiliar 
27 
28 with the changes to the different ways of working. Product–service offerings are more   complex 
29 
30 and  sophisticated  than  stand-alone  products.  This  complexity requires  the flexibility afforded 
31 
32 through more relational relationships, but also the benefits of task specialization and resource 
33 abundance. 
35 The third and final contribution is to treat the relationships within the service triad as 
36 
37 multidimensional rather than cooperative or competitive (a binary distinction prevalent in the 
38 
39 literature, e.g., Wu and Choi, 2005). Thus, a nuanced account of how the   manufacturer–supplier 
40 
41 relationship  affects  the   service  performance   of  the  supplier  towards  the      manufacturer’s 
42 customers is provided. The research also uncovered the impact of two contingent factors: service 
43 
44 site size and product–service penetration, and how they affected the performance of the  supplier 
45 
46 towards the manufacturer’s customer. The interplay between these was captured in an analytic 
47 
48 model and a series of propositions discussed below. 
49 In   this   research,   product–service   penetration,   site   size,   and   relationship-specific 
51 adaptations emerged as the pre-cursors of relational relationships, and in extension, high  service 
52 
53 performance. If a site has greater experience with these contracts they will be more familiar with 
54 
55 the documentation and web-based systems used, creating greater operational linkages. Therefore, 
56 
57 greater exposure to more advanced offerings leads to an increase in the operational linkages 
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between  the  site  and  the  manufacturer.  In  turn,  site  size  should  facilitate  greater  task 
4 
5 specialization. This could include staff dedicated to managing interlinking systems and staff 
6 
7 explicitly managing the Fortigo–site relationship. Size also means that greater turnover at a    site 
8 
9 —implying greater access to specialist resources (tooling, systems, databases, etc.)—   positively 
10 affects operational linkages. Relationship adaptations refer to investments to products, processes, 
12 and procedures specific to the relationship (cf. Cannon and Perreault, 1999). In this study, all 
13 
14 suppliers made significant investments in technology and training in order to provide better 
15 
16 service to Fortigo’s customers, suggesting that relationship-specific adaptations are necessary  in 
17 
18 this context. Overall, extensive exposure to product–service offerings, greater resources, and 
19 relationship   adaptations   would   have   created   and   enhanced   relationship-specific systems, 
20 
21 procedures and routines, that is, operational linkages. 
22 
23 Cooperation  is  higher  when  the site is  larger.  This could  be for the following reasons: 
24 
25 First,  as  a  site  increases  in  size,  task  specialization  and  access  to  resources  will   increase 
26 (Anderson  and  Schmittlein,  1984).  By creating  specialization,  larger  sites  may have specific 
27 
28 individuals  to  manage  the  cooperative  relationship.  Alternatively,  Fortigo  may  be  “picking 
29 
30 winners” and have more cooperative relationships with those sites that have more customers. 
31 
32 Operational linkages and cooperation enhance information sharing. This is because the two act as 
33 a  channel  (operational  linkages)  and  an  orientation  (cooperation)  for  greater      information 
35 exchange. 
36 
37 Increased cooperation reduced the reliance of the service site on legal bonds between it 
38 
39 and  the  manufacturer.  This  is  in  line  with  much  of  the  extant  research  that  suggests  that 
40 
41 cooperative norms reduce the level of formalization of the relationship (e.g., Poppo and   Zenger, 
42 2002). Reduced formalization is also a result of increased PS penetration. This may be due to the 
43 
44 recognition  that  services  are  heterogeneous  and  require  greater  flexibility  in  their  delivery 
45 
46 (Sampson and Froehle, 2006). Finally, service performance is directly enhanced by increased 
47 
48 relationship  adaptations,  information  sharing  and  reduced  reliance  upon  legal  bonds,  as the 
49 rigidity  of  contracts  would  negatively  affect  service  performance.  The  importance  of these 
51 connectors indicates that parties that provide and support product–service offerings should be 
52 
53 committed to investing time and resources to the relationship, as well as the sharing of  pertinent 
54 
55 information. By reducing reliance on contracts, both parties will also be more flexible   in jointly 
56 
57 working together to maximise the performance towards the customer. 
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This research supports the assertion that the connectors may not necessarily be correlated 
4 
5 with  each  other  to  reflect  a  one-dimensional  construct  of  “relationalism”  (Vesalainen   and 
6 
7 Kohtamaki, 2015). Relationships are normally multilevel, complex phenomena (Ritter et al., 
8 
9 2004), and incidents or exogenous variables that alter the state of one connector may or may  not 
10 have systemic effects that affect the other connectors and eventually performance. This  research 
12 shines some light onto the complexity of the phenomenon and how the interplay of   relationship 
13 
14 dimensions and contingent variables affect service performance. 
15 
16 
17 
18 5.2 Limitations and extensions to the work 
19 As  this  work  was  conducted  within  one  network,  the  results  may  be  unrepresentative    of 
20 
21 promising practices. The first logical extension is to see if the analytic model holds for other 
22 
23 firms and sectors in order to enhance its generalizability. A survey would also represent a fruitful 
24 
25 avenue for further research in order to formally test  hypotheses derived  from  the    propositions 
26 developed in this work. Further qualitative enquiry regarding the role of size and PS  penetration 
27 
28 could be conducted to understand whether there are additional contingent antecedents. Lastly, 
29 
30 this study focused on a one-way causal path. It investigated which relationship dimensions affect 
31 
32 service performance. The premise of reverse causality, i.e. whether service performance was  the 
33 driver (as well as the outcome) of relational relationships (cf. Autry and Golicic, 2010), or 
35 whether there exist feedback loops between the different elements of the model (e.g. whether 
36 
37 increased operational integration is conducive of higher PS penetration), was beyond the scope 
38 
39 of the work. Thus, this could be a worthy further research endeavor. 
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52 
53 
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56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Relationship 
connector 
Description Role 
 
Information 
exchange 
An expectation of an open sharing of 
information useful for both parties. 
Improves overall and service performance (e.g., 
Johnson and Mena, 2008; Bastl et al., 2012). Related 
concepts, such as communication, are central for 
channel performance and development of trust. 
 
 
Operational 
linkages 
The degree to which the systems, 
procedures and routines of both 
parties have been linked to facilitate 
operations. 
Important when providing solutions (Bastl et al., 2012). 
Joint activities and processes facilitate the flow of 
products, services, and information, and reduce 
transaction costs. Such processes, as part of supply 
chain integration, positively affect performance (e.g., 
Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001). 
 
 
Legal bonds 
Detailed and binding contractual 
agreements that specify the 
obligations and roles of both parties  
in the relationship. 
Provides safeguards and regulates exchange. Increases 
supplier performance (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004) 
but can become a liability. Informal control may act as  
a safeguard against inherent transaction risks (e.g.,  
Dyer and Singh, 1998), and is desirable in B2B service 
contexts (e.g., van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011). 
 
Cooperative 
norms 
Reflect expectations the two parties 
have about working together to 
achieve mutual and individual goals. 
Norms such as solidarity and flexibility, and the related 
concept of trust, facilitate innovation, value creation, 
learning and performance (e.g. McEvily et al., 2003). 
Trust also moderates the relationship between several 
other concepts (see Vesalainen and Kohtamaki, 2015). 
 
Buyer and 
supplier 
adaptations 
Investments in adaptations to process, 
product, or procedures specific to the 
needs or capabilities of an exchange 
partner. 
Directly enhance exchange performance. Important in 
servitized contexts (e.g., Lockett et al., 2011). 
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Table 3 
23 List of Participants 
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43 
44 
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46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
2 
Name Location Performance 
(since 2009)
*
 
Dual 
franchise
**
 
Number of 
employees 
Product– 
Service 
Penetration 
Chi Southwest of 
England 
4.19 / 5 NO 52 >50% 
Psi East of England 3.67 / 5 YES 34 ~20% 
Zeta South of England 3 / 5 NO 11 ~20% 
* The average performance score for all sites since 2009 was 3.67. 
** Whether or not the site has a franchise agreement with additional commercial vehicles manufacturers. 
 
Participants’ job positions Organization 
CEO  
 
 
 
 
Fortigo 
UK after sales director 
Head of UK network development 
Head of UK service and support 
Head of after sales business development 
Retail sales director 
National key account manager 
Repair and maintenance manager 
Regional manager, customer and technical support South 
Regional manager, customer and technical support East 
After sales key account manager 
Service advisor  
 
Chi 
General manager* 
Parts manager 
Service, marketing and business development manager* 
Service operations manager 
Dealer principal  
Psi Service site controller 
Parts manager 
After-market manager 
Dealer principal  
Zeta Parts manager 
Service manager 
Warranty and contracts manager 
*Indicates two interviews with this subject 
Total number of interviews: 26 
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42 
43 
44 
Connector 
Facets / manifestations 
Information 
exchange 
- Intensity, frequency, quality, openness of communication with counterparts face-to-face or over 
the phone 
- Level and quality of information exchanged through the web-based systems and portals 
Operational 
linkages 
- Evidence of joint routines and activities between individuals from Fortigo and the service site 
- For the service site employees: competence in and familiarity with the use of the web-based 
interlinking systems 
Legal bonds - Explicitness and rigidity of the relationship 
- Fortigo’s tolerance to deviations from what is prescribed in the contract 
- Evidence of any informal arrangements and possibility of bypassing the explicit rules 
Cooperative 
norms 
Whether there is: 
- concern about mutual success 
- recognition that problems are joint responsibilities and cooperation is necessary 
- willingness to make cooperative changes 
- a perception that Fortigo takes advantage of its bargaining position 
- a “partnership mentality” as opposed to pure commercial relationship 
Relationship – 
specific 
adaptations by 
service supplier 
- One-off (e.g., special machinery, facilities) and ongoing (e.g., personnel training) relationship- 
specific investments 
- Adaptations in the operation of the site specifically for Fortigo and its customers (e.g. extended 
operating hours) 
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Table 5 
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Synthesis of Within-Case Findings 
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26 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
4 
47 
48 
49 
Case Fortigo–Chi relationship Fortigo–Psi relationship Fortigo–Zeta relationship 
Information 
exchange 
- Frequent, open interpersonal communication. 
- Chi considered to be one of the best at transmitting 
and receiving electronic information. 
- Chi concerned at instances with timeliness and 
response times from certain Fortigo departments. 
- Psi happy with web-based information exchange but 
not with senior Fortigo managers and the sales 
department. Considered (by Fortigo) to be efficient at 
electronic information exchange. 
- Psi and Fortigo HQs both reluctant at times to 
engage in exchange of information so issues tend to 
“fester.” 
- Zeta finds it difficult to locate information and 
perceive that Fortigo could be better at sharing 
information. 
- Very low information exchange with key 
counterparts. 
- Perception they are “forgotten about.” 
- Evidence that they are not as good as other sites in 
providing complete and adequate information. 
Operational 
linkages 
- Familiarity with the web-based systems and 
adherence to the implicit roles and routines due to 
increased service penetration, efficient internal task 
allocation and training. 
- Joint activities with the salesmen, parts 
representative and regional manager. 
- Familiarity with the web-based systems and 
adherence to the implicit roles and routines due to 
investment in training and recruitment of extra 
personnel. 
- Recent collaboration for expansion of parts 
business, joint customer visits for problem solving 
with Fortigo regional engineer. No activities with the 
co-located Fortigo salesman. 
- Not familiar with the web-based systems. Lack of task 
specialization and experience due to small number of 
trucks under Fortigo contracts. 
- Absence of joint activities with Fortigo employees. 
Legal bonds - Clear understanding and application of standards 
and rules. 
- Long-term personal relationships allow informal 
issue resolution, and decrease reliance upon explicit 
rules. 
- Relationship perceived as overreliant on explicit 
rules and procedures. 
- Perceived inflexibility and intolerance to deviations 
from the prescribed behaviours, reflected through the 
reactions to recent fines imposed upon Psi by Fortigo. 
- Informal part of the relationship is underdeveloped. 
- Strong perception that the relationship is overreliant 
on explicit procedures. 
- Disappointed that Fortigo are so intolerant to 
deviations from the prescribed procedures. 
- Informal part of the relationship is not as developed. 
Cooperative norms - Future success requires joint effort to achieve 
individual or common goals. 
- Reciprocity, apt norms and willingness to proceed 
with cooperative changes. 
- Cooperative spirit permeating all organizational 
levels and aspects of exchange. 
- Psi devoted to a common future with Fortigo. Belief 
that they do their best to prove it but feel let down by 
Fortigo. Fortigo operate based on a mistaken 
perception of Psi. 
- Cooperation and common goals with regional 
engineer and the after-sales organization, but overall, 
team spirit is not always felt. 
- Zeta acknowledges that Fortigo are normally 
cooperative and helpful, though exceptions exist. 
- When referring to Fortigo as a whole, Zeta feels 
discriminated against and “messed about”. 
- Zeta considering a common future but more 
concerned about individual goals than common ones. 
Relationship 
adaptations 
- Commitment to extended opening hours and 
training. 
- Investment in infrastructure and in dedicated parts 
representative. 
- Significant investment in infrastructure and staff to 
change the poor reputation. 
- Extensive training even though some is thought to 
be unnecessary. 
- Significant early investment in infrastructure to 
continue being a franchisee. 
- Extended opening hours. 
- Extensive training even though at times looks 
unnecessary. 
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Dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-case comparison 
Relative ranking of cases in terms of the connectors 
Chi–Fortigo Psi–Fortigo Zeta–Fortigo 
Performance: 
high 
Performance: 
average 
Performance: 
low 
Information 
exchange 
Information exchange (both, interpersonal and electronic) is perceived to be high in 
the Chi case, moderate in the Psi case (interpersonal communication between 
certain individuals is problematic) and low in the Zeta case (both through 
interpersonal communication and the web-based systems). 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Low 
Operational 
linkages 
Chi and Psi show a similar level of operational integration (apart from the absence 
of joint activities with the salesman for Psi). Zeta has no joint activities with 
Fortigo and are not sufficiently familiar with the web-based systems. This reflects a 
low level of adherence to the set roles and routines, which in turn impairs the IT- 
enabled transmission and receipt of information with Fortigo. 
 
 
High 
 
 
Moderate /High 
 
 
Low 
Legal bonds Only Chi is comfortable with the degree of relationship formalization. The other 
two consider their relationships to be overly reliant on the prescribed rules, while 
the informal component seems underdeveloped. The perceived intolerance of 
Fortigo to deviations from the explicit rules is detrimental. However, they both 
acknowledge the necessity of some set rules. 
 
 
Moderate 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
Cooperative 
norms 
Only Chi has a cooperative relationship where norms such as mutuality, durability 
and flexibility permeate the exchange. The other two sites feel let down, 
undervalued, or exploited. However, it is recognized that many of the key contacts 
are cooperative and care for the good of the sites. 
 
High 
 
Moderate 
 
Low /Moderate 
Relationship 
specific 
adaptations 
All sites have extensive relationship specific adaptations. Even though to achieve 
the franchise status investment is mandatory, relationship adaptations are ongoing, 
and on the whole seem to be necessary in this context. 
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High 
 
 
High 
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